



Why are listeners sometimes (but not always)
egocentric?




Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Wang, JJ, Ciranova, N, Woods, B & Apperly, IA 2020, 'Why are listeners sometimes (but not always)
egocentric? Making inferences about using others' perspective in referential communication', PLoS ONE, vol.
15, no. 10, e0240521. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240521
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 11. May. 2021
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Why are listeners sometimes (but not always)
egocentric? Making inferences about using
others’ perspective in referential
communication
J. Jessica WangID
1*, Natalia Ciranova1, Bethany Woods1, Ian A. Apperly2*
1 Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom, 2 School of Psychology,
University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, United Kingdom
* j.wang40@lancaster.ac.uk (JJW); i.a.apperly@bham.ac.uk (IAA)
Abstract
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand others’ mental states, and that these men-
tal states can differ from our own. Although healthy adults have little trouble passing concep-
tual tests of ToM (e.g., the false belief task [1]), they do not always succeed in using ToM
[2,3]. In order to be successful in referential communication, listeners need to correctly infer
the way in which a speaker’s perspective constrains reference and inhibit their own perspec-
tive accordingly. However, listeners may require prompts to take these effortful inferential
steps. The current study investigated the possibility of embedding prompts in the instruc-
tions for listeners to make inference about using a speaker’s perspective. Experiment 1
showed that provision of a clear introductory example of the full chain of inferences resulted
in large improvement in performance. Residual egocentric errors suggested that the
improvement was not simply due to superior comprehension of the instructions. Experiment
2 further dissociated the effect by placing selective emphasis on making inference about
inhibiting listeners’ own perspective versus using the speaker’s perspective. Results
showed that only the latter had a significant effect on successful performance. The current
findings clearly demonstrated that listeners do not readily make inferences about using
speakers’ perspectives, but can do so when prompted.
Introduction
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand others’ mental states, and that these mental
states can differ from our own. This ability is fundamental for navigating the social world in
which we live. Without ToM, it would be impossible to achieve mutual understanding or even
interpret others’ simple actions, e.g., a friend’s point to a peppermill on the dinner table.
Although typically-developed adults have little trouble passing conceptual test of ToM, there is
much variability in their propensity to use what they know about others’ mental states in ongo-
ing communication (e.g., [2,3]). Instances of faux pas are regularly seen in daily life, and are
often due to the actor or speaker not fully accounting for others’ mental states. For example,
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the result of the Great British Bake Off final in 2017 was revealed hours ahead of broadcast due
to new judge Prue Leith forgetting that she was in a time zone hours ahead of the UK and con-
gratulated the winner on Twitter prematurely. Real life egocentric errors that carry higher
stakes can also be seen in the business and political domains (e.g., In the US presidential elec-
tion campaign in 2016, Hillary Clinton calling half of Trump’s supporters “a basket of deplor-
ables”, wiping out her chances of winning over their votes). Instances like these highlight that
we cannot assume successful or consistent ToM-use among people who would clearly pass
standard conceptual tests of ToM. Egocentric errors are frequently observed in real life, not
only in face to face communication, but also over email communications [4]. On the other
hand, such errors are far from ubiquitous: communicators frequently display sensitivity to per-
spective differences (e.g., [5–7]). This leads to a puzzle about why people only sometimes use
their ToM abilities. In the present study we investigated the possibility that listeners have a ten-
dency to overlook some of the inferential steps required to fully account for a speaker’s per-
spective. We employed a task that normally produces consistently high rates of egocentric
errors (e.g., [2,3]), therefore allowing space for improvement in ToM-use.
Referential communication tasks provide an ideal context to systematically capture com-
municators’ successes and failures in using ToM (e.g., [2,3,5,6,8–12]). In order for communi-
cators to correctly understand others’ reference, they need to account for the common ground
they shared with their communicative partner while avoid referring to information privileged
to themselves [13,14]. The premise of these tasks critically tests the degree to which communi-
cators are able to use what they know about others’ mental states during language comprehen-
sion (e.g., [2,3,5,6] and language production (e.g., [11,15]). A widely-used task in this domain
is the director task, which requires participants to take the role of listeners and follow instruc-
tions delivered by a director. Critically, there is a discrepancy between the participants’ per-
spective and the director’s perspective, as they each have a unique view of the same grid (see
Fig 1). Some of the slots on the grid are open to both the director’s side and the participants’
side, therefore any objects placed in these slots are in their common ground. In contrast, some
Fig 1. Examples of the grid display. An example of the experimental condition is shown on the left, with the control condition on the right. A critical instruction to
accompany this display would be “nudge the large present one slot up”. The only difference between the experimental condition and the control condition is that the
experimental condition contains a “distractor” (in this case, the largest present from participants’ view), which competes with a “target” (in this case, the largest present
from director’s view) to be the best-fitting referent for the director’s critical instructions. In the control condition, the distractor is replaced by an “irrelevant object” (in
this case, the barometer from participants’ view), which does not compete with target to be the best fitting referent.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240521.g001
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of the slots on the grid are blocked from the director’s view, therefore any objects placed in
these slots are in the participants’ privileged ground, as these objects cannot be seen by the
director. In order to correctly interpret the director’s utterances, participants need to realise
that the director’s perspective content is different to their own. In particular, participants need
to realise that the director has a restricted view of the grid, and that she can only see the objects
in the common ground. This requirement is heavily emphasised in the introductory proce-
dures to the task (see below for more detail). Critically, calculating the director’s perspective is
not sufficient to succeed on the task: participants must also interpret the director’s utterances
according to her perspective, not the participants’ own perspective. To do so participants must
set aside or inhibit their own perspective, and realise that the director’s perspective means she
cannot be referring to some objects. Failure to ignore their own perspective and successfully
apply the director’s perspective leads participants to commit egocentric errors in referent
selection and/or show egocentric tendencies in response time and eye movements. Given the
importance of ToM-use in social cognition, variations of the director task have been widely
employed to study the developmental changes [12,16–18], cross-cultural differences and simi-
larities [19–21], individual differences in social and cognitive functioning [22,23], and neural-
underpinnings of ToM-use [16,24,25].
A striking feature of the director task is the high rates of egocentric errors frequently
observed [2,3,12,16,18]. What is more, attempts to reduce rates of egocentric errors have often
been strikingly unsuccessful. Keysar et al. [3] attempted to maximise the saliency of a director’s
perspective by implementing a number of measures. For instance, they had the participating lis-
teners hide a referential competitor in an opaque bag themselves to highlight the director’s igno-
rance; they had the participants swap roles with the director during practice to highlight her
perspective; they even assigned the director a false belief so that the director held a distinctively
different belief to the participants. However, none of these measures made the listeners more suc-
cessful at using the director’s perspective. Similar degrees of egocentrism were observed when the
director had a salient false belief about the content of listeners’ privileged ground versus when she
was simply ignorant about it. This suggests that saliency of the director’s perspective content is
unlikely to account for the high rates of egocentric errors observed. Legg et al. [9] further con-
firmed that the level of difficulty in inferring a director’s perspective content did not have a signifi-
cant effect on the degrees of egocentrism listeners displayed. In this study, listeners were no more
successful in avoiding egocentric errors when the inferential process merely concerned computing
her visual access (level-1 visual perspective) versus the way in which objects appeared to her
(level-2 visual perspective). These findings suggest that the inference required to calculate others’
perspective content does not have a clear role in accounting for failure in ToM-use.
A mindreading model put forward by Apperly [26] suggests that mindreading involves
three constituent stages: calculating others’ mental states, storing the calculated mental state,
and using the calculated mental state to explain, predict, or interpret behaviour. Keysar et al
[3] and Legg et al [9] demonstrated that unsuccessful mindreading is unlikely to arise from the
calculation stage. Zhao et al. [18] studied the storage stage and showed that 8- and 10-year-old
children committed more egocentric errors when they were required to remember whether an
object belonged to the director’s perspective or their own privileged perspective. This suggests
that egocentrism could be at least partly attributed to failure in the storage stage. However, in
the director tasks where high rates of egocentric errors were observed in adults [2,3], there was
no explicit requirement to hold the director’s perspective in mind, because unlike the Zhao
et al. [18] study, the director’s perspective could always be inferred from the visual information
available at the time of need. Therefore some of the egocentric errors previously observed are
likely to arise from the final use stage. Specifically, having calculated the director’s perspective,
participants need to do two things to use it successfully. Firstly, participants must ensure that
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they are guided by the director’s perspective rather than their own. Secondly, participants need
to work out precisely how the director’s perspective constrains reference. It is worth noting
that in standard versions of the director task, the director’s perspective and the participants’
perspective differ in their visual access to various objects, which corresponds to level-1 visual
perspective judgements of what can be seen by others. The calculation of level-1 visual per-
spective content has been shown to be relatively effortless (e.g., [27,28]) therefore participants
are unlikely to have difficulty in calculating the content of the director’s perspective. Instead,
the critical process involved in this inferential step likely lies in inferring the implications of
having different visual perspectives to the director. In the context of the director task, the
implication is that the director’s instructions can be interpreted differently from participants’
own perspective versus the director’s perspective (e.g., the ‘large present’ in Fig 1 could be
interpreted as corresponding to different objects from the director’s perspective versus the par-
ticipants’ perspective). It is possible that the high rates of egocentric errors previously observed
(e.g., [2,3]) resulted from failure to achieve either or both of these steps. Such perspective-tak-
ing failures are also seen in everyday language production. In the example we described at the
start of this paper, Bake-off’s Prue Leith’s premature congratulation to the winner of the show
is unlikely caused by a difficulty in understanding the concept of time zones, or an ability to
understand that she has knowledge about the outcome of the show that is privileged to her but
not the show’s viewers. However, when it mattered, she still failed to account for her viewers’
perspectives, spoiling the show’s finale. Instances of perspective-taking failures highlight the
difficulty people encounter in using what we know about others’ mental states. Understanding
these processes would cast new light on the nature of how people use mindreading information
[26]. It is clear that having the conceptual understanding that people can have different per-
spectives does not guarantee successful use of such information. Therefore it is critical to
examine the potential sub-processes involved in ToM-use.
We employed a variation of the computer-based director task that has been shown to pro-
duce high rates of egocentric errors [2]. In order to encourage participants to take the inferen-
tial steps required for successful ToM-use, we systematically manipulated the overt
instructions to emphasise the need for participants to inhibit their own perspectives and to
infer the way in which a director’s perspective constrains reference. In Experiment 1, prompts
for the two steps associated with self-perspective inhibition and other-perspective-use were
presented together. If the high rates of egocentric errors previously observed are driven by par-
ticipants’ oversight of the inferential steps required, then the provision of an introductory
example of the full chain of inferences should significantly reduce the rates of egocentric errors
observed. Experiment 2 further investigated whether both prompts are required, and whether
they need to be given sequentially.
Experiment 1
The current experiment compared ToM-use performance following two version of overt
instructions: 1. a director’s perspective was made clear, and participants were instructed to
take her perspective into account during the task. 2. exactly the same instruction as version 1,
with the addition of an example of the full chain of inference required to successfully use the
director’s perspective. The example instructs participants not to use their own perspective, and
to use the director’s perspective to interpret her utterances.
Method
Participants. Sixty-eight participants (10 males, mean age 19.16 years, age range 18 to 23
years) gave informed consent to participate in the study and were tested by the same
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experimenter at the University of Birmingham. Ethical approval has been granted by the Ethics
Committee at the University of Birmingham (reference: ERN_09–719). The individual whose
image featured as the director in this manuscript has given written informed consent (as out-
lined in PLOS consent form) to publish their image. The sample size required to detect an
interaction between condition and task instruction was calculated using G�Power. Fifty-two
participants were required with power set to 0.8, effect size f set to 0.2. As this is a novel effect,
we tested 68 participants to ensure that we are able to detect the effect. Participants were given
course credit or a small honorarium as reward (the form of reward was not recorded for this
experiment, hence could not be included as a random effect in the analysis). Three participants
were replaced as two of the participants self-reported strategies unrelated to ToM-use, and the
third participant attributed conflict between self and other perspectives to computer fault.
Design & procedure. We manipulated the overt instruction so that the way in which a
director’s perspective constrains reference was either made explicit to the participants via the
overt instructions or not. A 2 x 4 x 2 mixed design was employed with condition (control, exper-
imental) and magnitude of common ground (3, 5, 7, 9) as within-participant variables, and task
instruction (with-example, without-example) as a between-participant variable. The only differ-
ence between the experimental condition and the control condition is that the experimental
condition contains a “distractor”, which competes with a “target” to be the best-fitting referent
for the director’s critical instructions (see Fig 1 for an example). In the control condition, the
distractor is replaced by an “irrelevant object”, which does not compete with target to be the
best fitting referent. It is crucial to include such a control condition, as the processing cost asso-
ciated with the control condition provides a baseline measure of the processing demands associ-
ated with visual search, speech processing, instructions following without perspective-taking,
and object selection. Since the experimental condition and the control condition only differed
by one object: the distractor versus irrelevant object, we can infer that any additional processing
cost observed in the experimental condition compared to the control condition would reflect
demand of perspective-taking, as opposed to processing visual stimuli, speech, instructions fol-
lowing, or object selection. The magnitude of common ground, which referred to the number
of open slots on a grid, was manipulated in another series of unpublished studies. The with-
example and without-example task instructions were both delivered as a combination of spoken
instructions, images, and experimenters’ actions. The only difference between the two sets of
instructions was that the with-example condition included an example to illustrate the way in
which the director’s perspective should be used to interpret her utterances. The exact wording
for the task instructions and their accompanying images can be found in Table 1.
The task instruction was followed by 2 practice images and 32 test images, presented in 4
test blocks. When an image appeared, participants had 5000ms to examine the image before
hearing 3 to 5 instructions from the director, one of which was a critical instruction. A total of
128 instructions were presented, with 32 critical instructions. The critical instructions were
“nudge the [scalar adjective] [noun] one slot [directional word]” (for the complete list of criti-
cal instructions, see Appendix A). Relational expressions were employed to maximise the like-
lihood of observing egocentric errors and the potential increase in successful ToM-use. The
remaining 96 instructions were fillers, 32 of which contained scalar adjectives (14 of the scalar
adjectives were redundant adjectives, included to minimise the likelihood for scalar adjectives
to signal the need to take the director’s perspective), and 16 contained non-scalar adjectives
(e.g., blue, included to minimise the likelihood for adjectives to signal the need to take the
director’s perspective), and the remaining 48 filler instructions were simple noun phrases. All
sentences were spliced together from individually recorded words to eliminate the possibility
for participants to use co-articulation to identify a referent prior to the onset of the adjective or
noun. If participants did not respond within 4000ms from the onset of the adjective (or noun
PLOS ONE Listeners do not always make inferences about using speakers’ perspectives in communication
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Table 1. Instruction wording in Experiments 1 and 2. All instructions in quotation marks were spoken, contents in parenthesis were acted out by an experimenter. The
only difference between various conditions was the example given on Slide 3.
Slide Spoken instruction Accompanying image
1 E1 & E2: “In this experiment, you will see a director, like the one shown on the screen. You will
also see a 4x4 shelf posited between you and her. There will be some objects on the shelf. The
director will give you instructions to move some of the objects around.
Some of the slots on the shelf are blocked from the director’s point of view, and she does not
know about the objects in those slots. Therefore she cannot ask you about those object. You
would have to take this information into account when nudging the objects”
2 E1 & E2: “In the next 20–25 minutes, you will see a lot of pictures like this. This is the shelf I
was talking about, there are 16 possible locations for objects to go. You will notice that some of
the slots have green backgrounds. You are able to see the objects in these slots. However, the
director is standing behind the shelf, on the other side. Therefore she doesn’t see and doesn’t
know about any objects placed in those slots (point to the five blocked slots). Since she doesn’t
know about these objects, she cannot possibly ask you to move any of them.”
3 E1 with-example condition & E2 other-explicit-self-explicit condition: “For example, if she
asks you to “nudge the short torch one slot left”, although you might be tempted to move this
object (point to the shortest torch), this object isn’t actually available to her. Therefore she
cannot be talking about this object, she must be talking about this object (point to middle
torch) instead, because this is an object that she can see and can talk about. Does this make
sense?”
E2 other-explicit- self-not-explicit condition: “For example, if she asks you to “nudge the
short torch one slot left”, she must be talking about this object (point to middle torch). Because
this is an object that she can see and can talk about. Does this make sense?”
E2 other-not-explicit-self-explicit condition: “For example, if she asks you to “nudge the
short torch one slot left”, although you might be tempted to move this object (point to the
shortest torch), this object isn’t actually available to her. Therefore she cannot be talking about
this object. Does this make sense?”
E1 without-example condition & E2 other-not-explicit- self-not-explicit condition: “For
example, if she asks you to “nudge the short torch one slot left”, you would have to consider her
perspective when you follow her instructions. Does this make sense?
4 E1 & E2: “To make sure everything is clear to you, this is how the shelf looks from where the
director is standing. Please keep her perspective in mind when you follow her instructions.”
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240521.t001
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where the instruction did not contain adjectives), then the trial timed out, and the next instruc-
tion was played or the next grid-image shown. As in Apperly et al. [2], participants responded
with a computer mouse, by performing a “drag and drop” motion as if moving the selected
object from one slot to another. Object selection accuracy and response time were based on
the first mouse click participants performed following an instruction. Participants were
informed that we were interested in their first mouse click, therefore they should consider
carefully before making a mouse click. Interest areas were drawn around each slot on the grid,
therefore a mouse click within the slot in which a correct object was positioned would qualify
as a correct response. Response times were calculated from the onset of an adjective or noun
until the first mouse click response.
Half of the images corresponded to the experimental condition, the other half corresponded
to the control condition. In the experimental condition, the item that best fitted the director’s
description on a critical instruction differed from the director’s point of view versus the partic-
ipants’ point of view. For example, when the director asked for the “large present”, the item
she referred to was the purple present in the left panel of Fig 1 as it is the larger of the two pres-
ents available to her (“target” hereafter). However, the item that best fitted the director’s
description from the participants’ point of view was the white present (“distractor” hereafter).
In order to correctly select a target, it was essential that participants utilized perspectival infor-
mation to resolve reference. The control condition was identical to the experimental condition
apart from that the distractor was replaced by an irrelevant item which did not compete as a
potential referent from the participants’ perspective (e.g., a barometer, see right panel of Fig 1).
Participants saw the grid images associated with both the experimental condition and its coun-
terpart in the control condition. The grid images were positioned at least a full block of 8 trials
apart, and in different halves of the experiment, minimising the possibility for the critical dif-
ference between the conditions to be recognised by participants. No participant was able to
describe the critical difference between the two conditions during debrief.
Results
Trial level data and the R code used in the analyses from the current study can be found in the
Supplementary Materials. We calculated the percentage of egocentric errors for each participant
in each condition. An egocentric error refers to a response error of selecting the distractor
rather than the target in the experimental condition. Selection of the irrelevant object in the
control condition provides a baseline for erroneous selections in the absence of direct competi-
tion between the participants’ and the director’s perspectives on a closely matched grid image.
Across the two experiments, only 2 of such selection errors were observed in the control condi-
tion. Selections of objects or spaces that are not distractors or targets were excluded from all
analyses, as these errors are rare, and it is difficult to interpret the cause of such errors. Trials
with response timeout were excluded prior to analysis, leading to exclusion of 4.41% of the
critical trials from the current experiment. The considerably lower error rate in the control
condition compared to the experimental condition lead to unequal variance between the two
conditions, which made it questionable to include condition as a factor in an omnibus analysis.
Therefore our analyses focus on percentage egocentric errors on the experimental conditions
(for descriptive statistics, see Table 2). The overall rate of egocentric errors could reflect incor-
rect responses prior to participants’ first correct response, or participants’ consistency in using
the director’s perspective, or to some combination of these factors. These factors are separately
informative about how instructions affect performance, therefore we examined the effect of
instructions on overall egocentric error rate, number of trials to first correct response, and
error rate following first correct response.
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The combined results from the number of trials to first correct response and the error rates
following first correct response can also help address an alternative account for any positive
effect that the with-example condition might have on performance. Recall from the introduc-
tion that previous studies of perspective-taking during referential communication show a
puzzling mixture of very good versus relatively poor performance. A potentially simple expla-
nation of this pattern would be that studies demonstrating good performance simply
employed clearer task instructions enabling more participants to understand that they should
use their ToM abilities. This explanation would tell us something about the importance of
instructions, but nothing about the underlying processes of ToM-use. If such an account were
correct, then the with-example condition should not only require fewer trials until participants
reach their first correct responses, but also show floor-level error rates following the first cor-
rect response, because superior instructions had removed the principal source of errors. To
verify this alternative account, we will additionally compare the error rates following first cor-
rect response against zero. Response times from trials with correct responses were reported in
the Supplementary Materials. Response time data should be interpreted with caution as these
reports contain relatively small number of trials, due to exclusion of a large number of errone-
ous trials.
A generalized linear mixed effects model was fitted to egocentric errors using the glmer()
function from the lme4 package in R [29]. The fixed effects were magnitude of common
ground (3 slots, 5 slots, 7 slots, 9 slots), and task instruction (with, without explicit instruction
to inhibit self-perspective and use the director’s perspective). Both fixed effects were included
as both main effects and interactions in all models. Both fixed effects were coded with contrast
coding, specifically deviation coding, where each level is compared to a grand mean. Partici-
pant and grid image were included as random effects. Our models for Experiment 2 addition-
ally included experimenter and reward as random effects. This was not possible here, as all
participants were tested by one experimenter, therefore experimenter was not entered as a ran-
dom effect. Information on the form of reward participants received was not recorded at the
time, therefore reward was not entered as a random effect. We attempted to fit models with
maximal random effect structure to all models [30]. The maximal model included intercepts
from both random effects, and random slopes for magnitude of common ground by partici-
pant, task instruction by grid image. The fitted model did not contain random slots for the
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Experiments 1 and 2.
E1 with-example without-example
Egocentric error (%) 5.48 55.84
SD 14.18 34.42
Number of trials to first correct response 1.44 4.58
SD 0.73 3.34
Error rate following first correct response (%) 9.03 50.58
SD 15.28 33.74
E2 other-explicit other-not-explicit
self-explicit self-not-explicit self-explicit self-not-explicit
Egocentric error (%) 9.05 13.03 21.04 37.67
SD 17.35 26.02 31.06 40.64
Number of trials to first correct response 1.48 2.32 3.16 4.12
SD 1.00 2.54 3.00 3.60
Error rate following first correct response (%) 15.28 14.96 28.97 35.71
SD 17.24 24.56 31.59 35.66
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240521.t002
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magnitude of common ground by participant. The fitted model was used to determine the sta-
tistical significance of a given main effect or interaction by removing one main effect or inter-
action term from the fitted model at a time, and comparing the models with versus without a
given effect. This comparison was conducted through the anova() function, which is suitable
for comparing the variance for one or more fitted model objects.
The number of trials to first correct response and error rate following first correct response
were aggregated by grid image and participant, therefore it was not possible to include these
terms in mixed models. As there was no viable random effect to be included in the models,
independent t-tests were carried out for these two dependent variables (for a summary of all
analyses for the current experiment, see Table 3).
An effect of instruction was found in percentage egocentric error, number of trials to first
correct response, and error rate following first correct response (see Fig 2). Participants’ per-
formance was significantly better across these measures when the way in which the director’s
perspective constrains reference was made explicit through a simple example in the instruc-
tion. The linear mixed effects models analysis on response times revealed a significant effect of
condition (experiment > control), χ2 = 9.85, df = 1, p = .002, along with a significant interac-
tion effect between condition and magnitude, p = .017. The full analysis can be found in the
Supplementary Materials. To verify the possibility that the with-example condition merely
clarified the instructions rather than improved ToM-use, the error rates following first correct
response were tested against a floor-level. Error rates following first correct response in both
conditions were significantly higher than floor-level (ts > 3.54, ps< .002, mean error rates
were 9.03% and 50.58% for the with-example and without-example conditions, respectively),
which does not lend support to such account.
Discussion
The current result showed that the provision of an exhaustive example of the way in which a
director’s perspective constrains reference led to dramatically lower rates of egocentric errors.
This suggests that the revised instructions likely helped participants to use the director’s per-
spective effectively. We do not think that the with-example condition merely presents an
improved instruction, as participants in this condition were not only quicker to produce a first
correct response, they were also consistent at maintaining a lower (but above floor) level of
egocentric errors since the first correct response. Furthermore, performance following “stan-
dard” instructions (without the example of the full chain of inference) was previously found to
correspond to social functioning profiles as measured by autistic and psychotic characteristics
[22]. Individuals who score highly on either an autistic or psychotic characteristic were less
Table 3. Summary of mixed models from Experiment 1.
β SE χ2 df p
Egocentric error
instruction -5.12 0.83 34.54 1 < .001
mag -0.53 0.43 1.48 1 0.224
instruction�mag -0.73 1.08 0.45 1 0.505
t df p
Number of trials to first correct response
instruction 5.12 32.5 < .001
t df p
Error rate following first correct response
instruction -6.41 42.1 < .001
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240521.t003
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likely to succeed in considering a director’s perspective compared to individuals who score
evenly on the two characteristics. This suggests that social functioning may account for com-
municators’ propensities to infer the relevance of their communicative partners’ perspectives
in the absence of any additional incentives.
It is worth noting that the with-example condition served two functions. Firstly, it
highlighted the way in which participants’ own perspective led to an incorrect response “. . .
you might be tempted to move this object, but this object isn’t actually available to her. . .”.
Therefore participants may have been prompted to inhibit the use of their own perspective to
interpret the director’s utterance. Secondly, it highlighted the way in which the director’s per-
spective should be used to interpret her utterances “. . . she must be talking about this object
instead, because this is an object that she can see and can talk about. . .”. To this end, partici-
pants may have been prompted to infer the ways in which the director’s perspective should be
used to interpret her utterance. It is noteworthy that successful implementation of either step
would lead to better performance. This is because a full inhibition of self-perspective would
lead participants to only consider objects in the common ground as potential referents, result-
ing in no egocentric errors. On the other hand, a correct inference about the ways in which the
director’s perspective should be used would also lead to correct interpretation of her utterance.
Therefore the current experimental finding could be explained by either successful self-per-
spective inhibition or other-perspective-use, or both. In other words, the current experiment’s
exhaustive example may not be necessary. It is possible that just one of the components of the
example is critical for improving the use of the Director’s perspective. Experiment 2 was
designed to disentangle the effects of self-perspective inhibition and other-perspective-use. It
also served as a replication of the striking reduction in egocentric errors observed in Experi-
ment 1 without the variation in the magnitude of common ground.
Experiment 2
In the current experiment, four versions of overt instructions were employed, each placing
selective emphasis on self-perspective inhibition versus other-perspective-use. The four ver-
sions of instructions were constructed in a factorial manner so that the effects of self-perspec-
tive inhibition and other-perspective-use can be fully dissociated. It is possible the two effects
to be individually effective in boosting ToM-use. It is also possible that a combined effect is
necessary to increase the propensity of ToM-use, in which case an interaction effect will be
observed.
Participants. One hundred participants (19 males, mean age 20.41 years, age range 18 to
29 years) gave informed consent to participate in the study and were tested by three experi-
menters at the Lancaster University. We expect the effect sizes for the current experiment to
be smaller than Experiment 1, as we are attempting to separate the contributions of the two
instruction steps. G�Power indicated that 76 participants were needed to detect an interaction
effect, with power set to 0.8 and assuming an effect size of 0.2. Therefore 100 participants were
recruited to ensure sufficient power is achieved. Six participants were replaced as they self-
reported strategies unrelated to ToM-use.
Design & procedure. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design was employed with condition (control,
experimental) as a within-participant variable, other-perspective-use (other-explicit, other-
not-explicit) and self-perspective-inhibition (self-explicit, self-not-explicit) as between-partici-
pant variables (see Table 1 for wording of instructions). Each participant was assigned to one
Fig 2. Pirate plot for the percentage egocentric errors from Experiment 1. Each circle represents the mean percentage egocentric error for a participant. The
bold horizontal lines correspond to the condition means, the light-coloured bands around the means correspond to the confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240521.g002
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of four versions of overt instruction. The remaining aspects of the design was identical to
Experiment 1, with the exception of the number of objects on the grid in the current experi-
ment was fixed at 8, so that it matched the complexity of the grid employed in a widely
employed version of the director task [2].
Results
Trials with response timeout were excluded prior to analysis, leading to exclusion of 7.13% of
the critical trials from the current experiment. The analysis strategy was identical to that of
Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. The fixed effects were other-perspective-use
(other-explicit, other-not-explicit) and self-perspective-inhibition (self-explicit, self-not-
explicit). Participant, grid image, reward (cash, course credit), and experimenter (RA 1, RA 2,
RA 3) were included as random effects. Models with only participant and grid image as ran-
dom effects were highly similar to the models that had included reward and experimenter as
random effects. The fitted model contained intercepts for all random effects, and random
slopes for self-perspective-inhibition by grid image, the interaction between self-perspective-
inhibition and other-perspective-use by grid image.
The two forms of reward were not designed to provide differentiating incentives for perfor-
mance. Both forms rewards were advertised as compensation for participants’ time rather than
direct incentive for performance. Nonetheless, to check whether this random effect signifi-
cantly alters the model fit, we compared a model with versus without the random effect of
reward. Comparison showed no significant difference between the two models, χ2 = 0.03,
df = 1, p = .864, BF01 = 37.04. Bayesian factor (BF01) was calculated to quantify evidence for a
null model relative to an alternative model. The null model includes all fixed and random
effects apart from the random effect of reward. The alternative model which additionally
includes a random effect of reward was compared against the null model. The Bayes factor was
calculated from the Bayes information criteria (BIC) obtained from the null and alternative
models [31]. The BF01 indicates that the alternative model was 37.04 times less favourable
than the null model. This suggests that reward is very unlikely to alter the model fit.
The number of trials to first correct response and error rate following first correct response
were aggregated by grid image and participant, therefore it was not possible to include either
terms in the mixed models. These models had reward and experimenter as random effects.
Maximal models were fitted to both the number of trials to first correct response and error
rate following first correct response. Both models contained intercepts for reward and experi-
menter, slopes for self-perspective-inhibition by reward, other-perspective-use by reward, the
interaction between self-perspective-inhibition and other-perspective-use by reward, self-per-
spective-inhibition by experimenter, other-perspective-use by experimenter, and the interac-
tion between self-perspective-inhibition and other-perspective-use by experimenter (for a
summary of all analyses for the current experiment, see Table 4).
Effects of other-perspective-use on percentage egocentric errors and number of trials to first
correct response were observed (other-explicit< other-not-explicit, see Fig 3). The instruction to
inhibit participants’ own perspective did not have a significant effect on egocentric error (BF01 =
27.78). The interaction between self-perspective-inhibition and other-perspective-use was not sig-
nificant (BF01 = 15.63). The linear mixed effects models analysis on response times only showed a
significant effect of condition, χ2 = 4.04, df = 1, p = .044 (control< experimental).
Replication of Experiment 1. Direct comparisons between the other-explicit-self-explicit
condition (equivalent to the with-example condition in Experiment 1) and other-not-explicit-
self-not-explicit condition (equivalent to the without-example condition in Experiment 1)
showed clear replication across all dependent variables: percentage egocentric error (p<. 001,
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other-explicit-self-explicit < other-not-explicit-self-not-explicit), number of trials to first cor-
rect response (p = .001, other-explicit-self-explicit < other-not-explicit-self-not-explicit), and
error rate following first correct response (p = .014, other-explicit-self-explicit< other-not-
explicit-self-not-explicit). Additionally, the error rates following first correct response across
all conditions were significantly higher than floor level (ts > 3.05, ps < .006; mean error rates
ranging from 14.96% to 35.71%), once again providing no evidence for the alternative account
that improved performance was merely driven by clearer instructions.
Discussion
The current experiment played a critical role in disentangling the respective effects of self-per-
spective inhibition and other-perspective-use. Results showed that selective emphasis on the
way the director’s perspective constrained reference clearly helped participants to infer the
correct ways in which to use the director’s perspective. This suggests that the ways in which
the director’s perspective constrains reference is the processing step participants most likely
neglected, and hence benefitted from being prompted via explicit instructions.
Interestingly, the instruction to inhibit the use of one’s own perspective had no significant
effect on measures of egocentrism. One possible explanation is that one’s own perspective is
salient and frequently used, therefore it cannot be easily modulated via instructions. However,
it is unlikely that participants lack the requisite cognitive ability to inhibit their own perspec-
tive. As shown by Apperly et al. [2], participants performed with much greater accuracy on a
director task when instructed to adopt a rule-based strategy to “discount all slots with grey
background” compared when instructed to “take the director’s perspective into account”.
Curiously, the current results suggest that even when specifically instructed to inhibit their
own perspective, participants do not appear to spontaneously adopt such a simple discounting
strategy. In contrast, a dramatic improvement in perspective-taking performance was seen
when an exhaustive instruction to both inhibit self-perspective and to use the director’s per-
spective was given. This highlights the possibility that self-perspective inhibition may need to
be understood in the full context of perspective-taking. It is not sufficient for participants to be
instructed to not use their own perspective if they do not know whose perspective they ought
to adopt and how to do so, which may boil down to being sufficiently incentivised to invest the
cognitive effort. Relatedly, the current results suggest that instructions for participants not to
Table 4. Summary of mixed models from E2.
β SE χ2 df p
Egocentric error
self 0.61 0.77 0.63 1 0.428
other 2.12 0.76 7.69 1 0.006
self�other 1.80 1.55 1.78 1 0.182
β SE χ2 df p
Number of trials to first correct response
self 0.99 0.53 2.96 1 0.085
other 1.66 0.52 4.12 1 0.042
self�other 0.56 1.55 0.13 1 0.721
β SE χ2 df p
Error rate following first correct response
self -0.04 0.05 0.45 1 0.500
other -0.13 0.08 1.48 1 0.225
self�other -0.13 0.17 0.56 1 0.453
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240521.t004
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use their own perspective to interpret the director’s utterance did not sufficiently incentivise
them to take the next inferential step and work out a way to use the director’s perspective. This
further confirmed that inference about the ways in which the director’s perspective constrains
reference is the processing step most likely neglected, as it was still overlooked when a different
part of the inference steps was modelled in the instructions.
General discussion
The current findings demonstrated that listeners tend to overlook the inferential steps required
to successfully use speakers’ perspectives, but can do so when prompted via instructions.
Experiment 1 showed that the provision of a clear introductory example of the full chain of
inferences required to successfully use a speaker’s perspective led to large improvement in lis-
teners’ performance. Experiment 2 provided a replication of the key contrasts in Experiment
1, and further specified that the inferences about using a speaker’s perspective, but not inhibit-
ing the listeners’ own perspective, played a significant role in lowering rates of egocentric
errors. These results suggest that listeners do not need to be provided with an example of the
full chain of inference in order to perform at a high level. Instead, listeners benefitted specifi-
cally from a prompt to identify precisely how a speaker’s perspective constrains reference.
Modelling inferential steps required for successful ToM-use
The current findings replicated previous observations that when listeners were simply
instructed to take a speaker’s perspective into account without specific instructions to inhibit
their own perspective or use the speaker’s perspective, they commit high rates of egocentric
errors. This indicates that in the context of this experimental task, the propensity for listeners
to invest the cognitive effort to take these inferential steps is low. In contrast, when small but
systematic manipulations of the overt instructions were employed to model the inferential
steps required to use the speaker’s perspective, performance improved considerably. This sug-
gests that the provision of an example of the inferences required to use the speaker’s perspec-
tive was sufficient to prompt successful ToM-use.
Such effects were not only observed in rates of egocentric errors, they were also seen in the
number of trials to first correct response across both experiments. This indicates that the
revised instructions not only reduced rates of egocentric errors overall, it also made partici-
pants faster to implement the correct strategy of taking account of the director’s perspective.
Taken alone, this finding might suggest that participants simply found it easier to understand
that they should take account of the director’s perspective when given the revised instructions.
Importantly, we think this may not be the full story, because the revised instructions also
reduced participants’ error rate after their first correct response (in Experiment 1), and these
egocentric errors after a first correct response were not eliminated (in either experiment). This
is not the pattern that would be expected if using the director’s perspective was perfectly easy
for participants once the revised instructions had enabled them to perform the task in the way
intended. Instead we suggest that the revised instructions may have incentivised participants,
via concrete examples, to make the required inference about using the speaker’s perspective
until they have successfully resolved a critical reference.
Interestingly, effects of instruction on other-perspective-use were seen in the overall rates
of egocentric error and the number of trials to first correct response, but not in error rate
Fig 3. Pirate plot for the percentage egocentric errors from Experiment 2. Each circle represents the mean percentage egocentric error for a participant.
The bold horizontal lines correspond to the condition means, the light-coloured bands around the means correspond to the confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240521.g003
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following first correct response. Notably, this measure did capture differences between the “all
or nothing” conditions (the with-example versus without-example conditions in Experiment 1
and the other-explicit-self-explicit versus the other-not-explicit-self-not-explicit conditions in
Experiment 2). This suggests that highlighting the ways in which the speaker’s perspective con-
strains interpretation of their instructions may not on its own offer sufficient incentives for
participants to use the speaker’s perspective consistently, making it possible to observe an
additional benefit from being prompted to ignore one’s own perspective.
The current study identified two possible sub-processes in the use stage of the Apperly [26]
mindreading model. In order for listeners to successfully use what they know about a speaker’s
perspectives, they need to inhibit information privileged to themselves, and infer how the speak-
er’s perspective constrains interpretation of their message. The current finding that prompts for
listeners to use a speaker’s perspective significantly reduce rates of egocentric errors indicates
that listeners were unlikely to make such inferences spontaneously. In contrast, prompts for lis-
teners to inhibit their own perspective did not significantly lower rates of egocentric errors over-
all. We assume that self-perspective-inhibition is nonetheless integral to ToM-use, but that
these results indicates that prompting participants to inhibit their own perspective had little
overall effect, as discussed in Experiment 2. The dissociated effects of self-perspective inhibition
and other-perspective use could help explain the high rates of egocentric errors observed in pre-
vious studies [2,3], and potential reasons for the great difficulty in lowering rates of egocentric
errors. It seems likely that listeners know that they need to account for the speaker’s perspective
in some way, and they know that this implies that they should not use their own perspectives to
interpret the speaker’s utterance. However, not all listeners spontaneously inferred the ways in
which the speaker’s perspective constrains interpretation of her instruction.
Variability in ToM-use
The current findings revealed that consistency in ToM-use cannot be taken for granted. This
echoes recent work which suggests that the context and saliency of the cues associated with self
and other could alter the ways in which perspectives are inferred and considered over the
course of an interaction [32–34]. Additionally, a conversational partner and their social rela-
tionship with the listener could determine the degrees to which listeners are motivated to take
their partner’s perspective into account [35]. Furthermore, specific conversational goals could
also affect the degrees to which speakers display sensitivity towards their listener’s perspective
[36]. Unlike conceptual tests of ToM, which typically delivers a pass versus fail verdict, ToM-
use clearly varies according to a wide range of contextual factors. On the one hand, this may fit
with our intuition about the variability of everyday social interactions. Faux pas do occur, yet
they do not occur all of the time nor do they always occur to the same individual. On the other
hand, the variability in ToM-use makes for a difficult theoretical debate. It is possible that the
ongoing debate about whether listeners readily take a communicative partner’s perspective
into account is unnecessarily dichotomous. It may be more productive to identify the context
in which communicators succeed or fail to account for others’ perspective. Additionally, with
large degrees of variability in the experimental paradigms employed and the task instructions
delivered, it is critical for future work to systematically report full instructional materials, so
we can begin to understand the ways in which communicators may be incentivised to take oth-
ers’ perspectives.
Conclusion
The current findings clearly demonstrated that listeners do not readily make inferences about
using speakers’ perspectives, but can do so when prompted. Successful referential
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communication requires listeners to infer that 1. they should not use their own perspective to
resolve reference 2. the specific ways in which a speaker’s perspective constrains reference.
Two experiments showed that an example of the full set of inferential steps required led partic-
ipants to much greater levels of success in referential communication. Furthermore, specific
prompt to use the speaker’s perspective on its own was effective in boosting performance. The
current findings suggest that inference about the ways in which others’ perspectives need to be
used is likely to be the primary obstacle to successful referential communication. Furthermore,
simple manipulations such as an introductory example of the inferential steps required, can
incentivise listeners to invest the cognitive effort to overcome such obstacles. Finally, the cur-
rent findings provide an important foundation for advancing our knowledge about individual
differences in mindreading in real life. A fruitful future direction would be to investigate the
interactions between individual differences in the propensity to make the required inferences
at the right time, cognitive flexibility (e.g., [10], and social functioning (e.g., [22,35]). Such
insights will bring us closer to understanding the successes and failures in everyday
mindreading.
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